Talks will have to be expanded and the position of Ukraine, that of a sovereign nation invaded by a wider neighbor, taken into consideration

 

February 24 marks the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a grim landmark, with the two major combatants locked in a battle in the Donbas that began a full 12 years ago.

It also marks the failure to date of a variety of peace plans, the most recent being the 28-point plan associated with Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, a well-known real estate developer and billionaire.

Though talks continue, the Russian side is unwilling to make even minor concessions. Happily, for their team, there is no need. Trump has put pressure on Ukraine to cede both occupied and unoccupied territory. In turn, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is reluctant to sign a document that forces him to give up any Ukrainian land.

There are several reasons for this impasse.

First, the Russian negotiators are more seasoned and committedthan the two American delegates, and do not believe Ukraine has any options other than to cede the two Donbas regions (Donetsk and Luhansk), Crimea (held since 2014), Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. In the latter two of these regions, Russia has at best a foothold, and Ukraine currently holds major strongholds in western Donetsk.

Russia’s leading figure at the table in Geneva is Vladimir Medinsky, a fanatical nationalist, journalist and historian who was formerly the Minister of Culture, and author of a bestselling book entitled Myths about Russia. The book maintains inter alia that the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 was a brilliant move, and the joint Soviet-Nazi military celebration that followed never happened.

His main goal is to dispel “myths” about Russia propagated by Western writers and to present his country in the best possible light. He maintains that Russia does not want war but is prepared to fight for 1-2 years, and if necessary, longer, as in the long 18thcentury war with Sweden, which lasted for 21 years.

In putting Medinsky back as the head of the delegation, and instead of someone linked to the military intelligence services (GRU), as in the Abu Dhabi negotiations in January, Putin can be sure the direction of talks will acquire a quasi-academic flavour. In short, they would drag on without reaching any conclusions.

Hence, one can understand Zelensky’s crude comment on X, that “I don’t need historical shit to end this war and move to diplomacy. Because it’s just a delay tactic. I read no less [sic!]history books than Putin. And I learned a lot. I know more about his country than he knows about Ukraine.”

Second, the American team leader makes no pretence of being a neutral mediator. Witkoff is on record as describing Putin as “a great guy” and “a good friend.” In October, Witkoff advised Russia’s leading foreign policy aide, Yuri Ushakov, on how to handle Trump. and suggesting that Trump and Putin should have a phone conversation before Zelensky visited the White House. He even expressed his view to the Russian side that a peace agreement would require Ukraine to give up the Donbas.

Last August, Witkoff stated that Trump’s symbolic but essentially fruitless summit with Putin in Alaska was a “victory,” and the two sides were close to an Article 5-like agreement that would guarantee no further Russian aggression once the existing demands were met. No such agreement has ever been offered.

Third, and related, Trump’s team are not only pro-Russian in sympathies, but they have no diplomatic training and have allowed Russia to dictate the terms. Even the so-called “Witkoff Plan” was written by the Russians and handed to the Americans for consent. Witkoff has never visited Ukraine.

Fourth, the Americans are not operating as part of the Western alliance or the leading power of NATO; they are acting alone, without the support of the European Union, the United Kingdom, or Canada.

Further, they are facilitating and embracing authoritarian leaders and dictators. Trump brought the “highly respected” dictator, Aliaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus, out of isolation, ending US sanctions. He has imposed tariffs on the United States’ main allies and threatened war with Denmark if it does not cede Greenland.

The Trump team’s priority is making deals that bring more wealth to the ruling family of the United States, controlling the mineral wealth of Ukraine, creating American businesses in occupied Gaza, and acquiring Venezuelan oil after abductingthat country’s president.

Trump and Putin are modern-day gangsters dividing up the wealth of conquered territories and businesses. Their outlook is similar, particularly their ruthlessness against perceived enemies and willingness to resort to force as the principal means of negotiation.

The difference, however, lies in the backgrounds of the two leaders. Putin has never cast off the role of former head of the security services, and his Security Council includes several figures from the current FSB. Though his economic power is limited, he has a stronger personality and has constantly outmanoeuvred his American counterpart to avoid firm commitments.

Zelensky has his own problems, but has constantly maintained the position that Ukraine’s best hope lies in long-term US aid and security.

Yet if Ukraine is to emerge from the invasion of its territories, destruction of its energy outlets, kidnapping of its children, and thousands of military casualties, and migration of millions of inhabitants, it will require a better mechanism to reach a settlement than the Trump team has provided. The talks will need to be widened and Ukraine’s position—that of a sovereign nation invaded by a larger neighbour—taken into consideration.

The world otherwise could revert to the sort of Great Power imperialism and spheres of interest that preceded the First World War. In the meantime, the death toll on both sides continues to rise.

Di David Roger Marples

David Roger Marples è un illustre Professore universitario di Storia della Russia e dell'Europa orientale presso l’Università di Alberta. È autore di sedici libri di autore singolo, tra cui Understanding Ukraine and Belarus (2020), Ukraine in Conflict (2017), Our Glorious Past: Lukashenka's Belarus and the Great Patriotic War (2014) e Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (2008). Ha pubblicato oltre 100 articoli su riviste peer-reviewed. Ha anche curato quattro libri sull'energia nucleare e la sicurezza nell'ex Unione Sovietica, nella Bielorussia contemporanea e in Ucraina. All'Università di Alberta, ha ricevuto il J. Premio Gordin Kaplan per l'eccellenza nella ricerca (2003) e la Coppa dell'Università nel 2008. Nel 2009, è stato Visiting Fellow per il Wirth Institute presso il Dipartimento di Storia Europea Contemporanea dell'Università di Innsbruck, dove ha tenuto un corso sull'Ucraina e la Bielorussia come Paesi di confine dell'UE. Nel 2013, è stato Visiting Fellow presso il Centro Slavico ed Eurasiatico, Università di Hokkaido, Giappone.